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The Spontaneous Philosophy of the Critics
The Sokal hoax shares with other controversies of our time the typical feature of erupting suddenly with the threat of dire consequence, only to disappear quickly and nearly completely from public consciousness. No longer perceived as a crisis of the day, the affair is more likely now to elicit weariness with this particular battlefield of the culture wars. I revisit the controversy with the purpose of grasping its continuing claim upon the present even as it recedes into the limbo of the recent past. This claim is nothing other than its significance in the history of criticism. If the Sokal affair belonged to a certain moment in the culture wars, it also has a place in the longer history of conflict between the sciences and the literary humanities or what goes conventionally by the name of the two cultures debate. Yet the relation between the Sokal affair and this longer history is by no means obvious. I will argue in this essay that in the Sokal affair the matters at issue in the two cultures debate were confused with those at stake in the culture wars. A clarification of the actual relation between these distinct conflicts will reveal that the Sokal affair has less to tell us The discussion to follow assumes on the reader's part a general but not a detailed recollection of the texts comprising Sokal's hoax and the responses.' Because any account of the controversy, even the barest narrative summary, will already have embarked on an interpretation, I will remind my readers before proceeding further of those aspects of the affair most pertinent to the interpretation I advance here. Chief among these is the fact that the title of the Spring 1996 double issue of Social Text in which Sokal's hoax article appeared, entitled Science Wars, deliberately connected controversies within science studies to the culture wars.2 The framing of the Social Text issue by the notion of science wars-a term not previously in wide circulation-highlighted new (at least to many in literary study!) and sometimes controversial work in the history, sociology, While the publication of the hoax article was enabled by the failure of the editors to detect its spurious physics, its deeper embarrassment arose from Sokal's capacity to reproduce postmodernism as a discursive bloc, in effect, the ideology of a party in the culture wars. This was exactly the same polemical effect as that produced by framing science studies with the term science wars. As a litany of certain familiar positions in a polemical field, the general tendency of Sokal's essay commanded assent rather than aroused suspicion. But whose assent? In retrospect, the scandal cannot finally be laid at the door of the editors alone, as it was precisely the widely credited positions expressed in Sokal's article that imparted to the hoax the symptomatic significance of a little Lysenko affair. At the same time, it must be observed that the party embarrassed in the hoax was not the academic Left in toto; nor was it science studies in particular.5 The consequence of public ignominy was suffered largely, in fact, by the literary academy and by a number of humanistically oriented enterprises in other disciplines such as philosophy and anthropology. That Sokal's target was primarily the humanities is bluntly stated in the first sentence of the Lingua Franca article: "For some years I've been troubled by an apparent decline in the standards of rigor in certain precincts of the academic humanities" ("P," p. 62).6 Now this is not to deny that some scientists were, and remain, quite unhappy with science studies and suspicious of what they see as the left politics of some in these fields; it is simply to recall that many of those who do science studies have little interest in postmodernism and that many of these scholars do not see their work as presenting a left political critique of science.7
The scandal of the Sokal hoax was marked, then, by a confusion between the discursive bloc of postmodernism and the field of science studies. When the scandal filtered through to the mass public sphere, the distinction between these fields was erased, and the stakes of the scandal were defined simply in terms of a quarrel between the sciences and the literary academy, the two cultures. But this confusion must be understood as already implicit in Social Text's framing of science studies by the term science wars. It was scarcely surprising that in the public sphere the scandal was seen as another instance of the literary academy's "politicization" of the cultural field, yet another expression of the radical "postmodernism" emanating from literature departments.8 Science studies itself, as it is actually and diversely practiced, disappeared as the main target of media attack. The public misconstruction of science studies thus unwittingly confirmed the literary academy's desire to annex science studies to a theoretical program internal to its own discipline (roughly indicated by the name of postmodernism), as well as its desire to conscript science studies into the culture wars (the scene of its external politics). The double strategy of appropriation and conscription was enabled, as we can now demonstrate, by a certain intersection between the fields of postmodernism and science studies. In retrospect, this was a dangerous intersection, the site of a collision rather than a convergence. The area of intersection was, of course, epistemology, the most dangerous of the games philosophers play. One wonders whether the Sokal hoax would have had quite the mobility it manifested in the public sphere if Sokal had not declared in the second paragraph of his article: "It has thus become increasingly apparent that physical 'reality,' no less than social 'reality,' is at bottom a social and linguistic construct" ("T," p. 217). The acceptance of the article for publication was regarded as proof that the editors of Social Text, supposedly representing the literary academy, endorsed nothing less than a lunatic disbelief in the physical world, a position so extreme that it could easily be cited in the mass media-and so it was, repeatedly-as evidence of the absurdity to which literary studies and cultural studies had sunk. The concept of "reality" quickly became the fetishized term in a public debate that was far removed from the philosophy of science and mired from the beginning in low-level philosophizing on the obtuseness of the physical world.
While it would be easy to dismiss the public response to the Sokal hoax as an expression of the very anti-intellectualism that fuels the culture wars (it was that), it must be admitted that the hoax article's antirealist declaration simply restated an epistemological position the literary academy might very well believe that it holds in common with some versions of science studies. Sokal's triumphant, though of course ironic, dec-8. In retrospect it is worth remarking the strangeness of the fact that a literary scholar such as Stanley Fish should rise to the defense of science studies, in which he had previously evinced little interest; see his op-ed piece, "Professor Sokal's Bad Joke," New York Times, 21 May 1996, p. A23. laration of this position proved an effective accelerant in spreading the scandal; but in retrospect it was this statement more than any other in Sokal's article that had to be affirmed by the literary academy. It was this statement above all others that pointed to a possible alliance of science studies with the postmodern bloc.' And because the antirealist position had achieved something close to the status of consensus in the literary academy, it did not have to be backed up by fully elaborated philosophical arguments; it could simply be stated.10
The philosophical positions implicit in a given discipline's knowledgeclaims are complicated by the status of philosophy itself. Though it is one discipline among many, it has strong historical claims to the position of primus inter pares. Consequently, the resort of the disciplines to epistemological defense is always subject to a kind of oversight by philosophy itself. As an instance of such oversight, one can do no better than a late essay of Althusser's, in which he cross-examines the philosophizing of scientists under the arch but appropriate rubric of "the spontaneous philosophy of the scientists."" Spontaneous philosophy as Althusser defines it is inseparable from scientific practice and stands in relation to it as a kind of ideology, though not an ideology that translates simply into positions on a political spectrum. This ideology has two complexly related components: an internal, which is the scientist's account of scientific practice, and an external, consisting of the specifically political and social commitments of scientists. Althusser is careful not to reduce the internal component to an effect of the external ideology.
If there is a "spontaneous philosophy of the scientists," I suggest that the Sokal affair brought to light an analogous "spontaneous philosophy of the critics." Let us acknowledge, if this is still a question for anyone, that science as a practice is never wholly autonomous, that it does not transcend political or social context. But that was not the issue in the Sokal affair. The issue was rather the necessary political implications of realist epistemology, as this is supposed to underlie the practice of science (just as, conversely, antirealist epistemology is assumed in the critique of science). The spontaneous philosophy of the critics consisted not simply in antirealism per se but just as much in the assumption that epistemological positions have a necessary relation to political positions. 9. The possibility of an alliance against scientific realism depended chiefly on the fact that the notion of social construction was a commonplace in both fields, a question I will take up in the second section of this paper. Sokal hoped to discredit postmodernist discourse by claiming in his Lingua Franca article that realism, so far from entailing an inherently reactionary politics, was the more authentically left position." This strategic repositioning of realism was more challenging than Paul Gross and Norman Levitt's avowedly antileftist polemic, but it also oddly mirrored the axiom long prevalent in the literary academy of a necessary correlation between epistemology and politics. The hoax had the salutary effect of making the "spontaneous" entailments of this axiom very clear, namely, that an antirealist epistemology (alternatively expressed as antifoundationalism or relativism) is a requisite for any progressive politics and, conversely, that realism, foundationalism, or universalism underlie-at the level of the episteme, as it were-all that is regressive in our society. Because these philosophical positions (and their opposites among the scientists) were typically overstated and underargued, they could easily be reduced to caricature, which was quickly disowned on both sides. The scientific realists were only too happy to concede the cultural context of science, just as the cultural antirealists were delighted to concede the reality of the physical world. But if the controversy could have been resolved by displacing speech acts to the register of common sense, it would never have been propelled into the arena of public scandal. Spontaneous philosophy is something more than common sense, if also less than adequate philosophy. It is a discourse that is generated casually, in the context of practice, or urgently, in the context of a legitimation crisis.'3 While there were real stakes in the philosophical positions espoused in the Sokal affair, these were perhaps not what the antagonists imagined. Most immediately, the integrity of philosophical discourse itself was at stake. The philosophical complexity of the question of the real was sacrificed to a preemptive linking of epistemology to politics. Realism, of course, names a recurrent problematic of philosophical discourse, but in the history of philosophy realist and antirealist positions have taken a number of very different forms, by no means equivalent in their occasions or implications (political or otherwise). Let us only recall here the conflict between realism and nominalism in late Medieval thought, which seeded the intellectual ground of early Protestantism; between realism and idealism in post-Kantian philosophy, in reference to which the names of Hegel or Marx can be invoked; and between realism and empiricism in the history of science itself, exemplified by the dispute between Planck and Mach.'4 Scientists have included in their number quite sophisticated phi-12. "I'm a leftist because of evidence and logic, not in spite of it" ("P," p. 64). 13. Spontaneous philosophy, it should be stressed, is enabling, despite its problematic simplifications. The fusion of notions derived from both Derrida and Foucault, for example, in much literary criticism enables certain projects to go forward, even though the differences between these two figures cannot easily be reconciled, if at all.
14. Is the antirealism of literary and cultural studies, as a spontaneous philosophy, vulnerable to a similar reduction to common sense? The spontaneous philosophy of the critics evidently leans for support on a number of manifestly sophisticated and diverse philosophical projects within the general field of poststructuralist or postmodern thought. Still, it is not the usual business of the critics to enter into these philosophical debates in any extensive way. Postmodernist thought passed into U.S. literary and cultural criticism transformed into "theory," which by virtue of an alchemy of dissemination made very complex arguments available in the form of touchstonelike position statements. These position statements typically recede to the background in the everyday business of the discipline, which is the interpretation of cultural works; they tend to be brought forward again only in contexts of controversy, or in defense of the aims of criticism. Since it often consists of calling into question what passes for common sense, the spontaneous philosophy of the critics might seem, on the face of it, more sophisticated than its analogue among the scientists. Yet I want to insist here upon its spontaneous character. This is to say that the calling into question of common sense is nothing other than the common sense (or "consensus") of the literary professoriate. Like the common sense of the laity, it circulates as what is given for this discourse community.
The Reassertion of Cultural Criticism
It is a peculiarity of the literary academy today that the spontaneous philosophy of the critics derives from an apparent rupture with the commonsense tradition of Anglo-American empiricism and a reaffiliation of supposed to make of Pierre Duhem, whose antirealist or "fictionalist" philosophy of science was accompanied by far right politics? On the development of physics in relation to philosophy, see Theodore M. Porter, "The Death of the Object: Fin de siecle Philosophy of Physics," in Modernist Impulses in the Human Sciences, ed. Dorothy Ross (Baltimore, 1994), pp. 128-51.
15. It is worth remarking in looking back over the relation between scientists and philosophy in the last 150 years that scientists of the period between 1850 and 1950 were much more actively engaged in philosophical discourse than their successors. Conversely, by the mid-twentieth century, Anglo-American philosophers had become almost exclusively oriented to the philosophy of science. The decline of interest among scientists of the postwar period in philosophy surely made them more vulnerable to cruder versions of spontaneous philosophy; but during the same period they also became very effective communicators in the public sphere. No one who considers the relations between the disciplines and the public sphere can fail to be struck by the fact that humanist intellectuals have by contrast been largely unsuccessful in communicating the value and content of their work to the public. criticism with a line of continental philosophers. While it would be difficult to overestimate the rupture indicated by the name of theory, it nonetheless remains possible to detect beneath this discontinuity a certain enduring orientation of critics within the general intellectual and political field, a remarkable continuity in the discourse of criticism from the nineteenth century to the present. This continuity underlies the recurrence of the two cultures conflict. At the origin of the conflict was the ascent of the natural sciences in the later nineteenth century to a preeminent position among the discourses of truth and the simultaneous decline in the social prestige of the cultural critic, a figure who for much of the previous century dominated the public sphere. Any assertion of a thorough break between "cultural criticism" and literary postmodernism is belied by this newest outbreak of conflict between criticism and the sciences. This conflict is no longer located primarily in the journalistic public sphere, as it was in the nineteenth century, but in the university. Yet even as a university discipline, criticism must be seen as a reassertion of "cultural criticism" when it aspires to offer a critique of society. This critique was formerly distinguished by a tendency to focus periodically on the claims and effects of science at the same time that it progressively enlarged its scope over the two centuries. Cultural criticism came to target much more than the machine, regarded as the mere avatar of scientific or industrial civilization. The cultural critics went on to take utilitarianian philosophy, instrumental reason, and ultimately reason itself as the objects of critique. I suggest that the periodic lapse of this critique into the expression of hostility toward science represents a recurrent falling off in the sophistication of cultural criticism, which after all has given us Adorno as well as E R. Leavis. While the reductive claim that the ills of society can be traced to the triumph of science is a notion that few would credit today outside the cult of the Unabomber, science has reemerged as the object of cultural criticism.19 In our time, antagonism to science is not an expression of Ludditism, however, but rather a response of the cultural disciplines in the university to the scientific monopoly on truth; it expresses the fear that criticism will be relegated to mere opinion, a discourse that cannot claim to be knowledge.2" It can be argued that this anxiety already troubled Arnold 18. Cultural studies' break with the elitism and conservative politics of cultural criticism can be acknowledged here without compromising the more difficult point I want to make, which is that a continuity of orientation toward science persisted through this transformation. For the relation of postmodernist criticism to mass culture, see Andreas Huyssen, After the Great Divide: Modernity, Mass Culture, Postmodernism (Bloomington, Ind., 1986).
19. It must be remarked that the emergence of a commonplace distinction (itself often dubious) between technology and science has permitted what we call cultural studies to remain a version of cultural criticism while declaring a break from its precursor. Just as cultural studies inverted the relation between high and mass culture, in order to affirm what cultural criticism had rejected-the supposed depredations of mass culture-so technology has come to play the role of the "low" in relation to the "high" function of science. Cultural criticism of the nineteenth century more often identified, or confused, science with technology. The celebration of technologies such as the internet as the site of cultural play makes cultural studies appear to be quite the opposite of its residually Luddite precursor; but it is only the distinction between technology as the site of play and science as avatar of reason that makes it possible for cultural studies to submit science to a skeptical critique without seeming to risk identification with cultural criticism. 20. Leavis comes uncomfortably close to conceding that the epistemic status of criticism is opinion, however sophisticated or educable opinion might be. So he writes in Two and the cultural critics of the later nineteenth century; but the triumph of the sciences in the twentieth-century university represented a much greater challenge to those critics who hoped to make criticism itself into a university discipline. That institutional identity imposed a greater epistemic burden on critical discourse than was ever borne by its journalist precursors.21 This burden could be discharged in two very different ways, either by developing criticism itself as a science (a strategy only ambiguously and abortively pursued)22 or by cultivating its historical distinction from science as a disciplinary difference, the difference signalled by the notion of the "humanities."23
The epistemic anxiety of criticism was alleviated in the end (though of course not completely) by institutional means, largely by strategies of professionalization that were unavailable to the cultural critics of the nineteenth-century public sphere.24 But the transformation of criticism Cultures? that "a judgement is personal or it is nothing; you cannot take over someone else's. The implicit form of a judgment is: This is so, isn't it?" (p. 48). The movement in U.S. criticism away from criticism as judgment to criticism as interpretation is an attempt to address this problem, as I hope to demonstrate elsewhere. ogy and literary history, both of which were defined in their heyday as empirical and even scientific disciplines. Criticism, by contrast, was a discourse of judgment rather than analysis or demonstration, and it was not until the initital ventures of Richards that literary critics could contemplate making criticism itself scientific. Richards's rapprochement with science was short-lived, however, and criticism more usually adopted an adversarial relation to science in the twentieth century.
23. A definition of the humanities must be specified for the purpose of my argument because the grouping of disciplines under this heading no longer conforms to a coherent distinction among methodologies. For example, American analytic philosophy thinks of itself as closer to science than to the traditional humanities, while history often conceives itself as closer to social science than to narrative or literary forms. In this essay I understand the category of the humanities as comprising literary and cultural studies based on a methodology of interpretation. The significance of this specification will be taken up in section four below.
24. Public sphere critics, as journalists, might consider themselves in some sense to be professionals, but this sense of professional identity differs considerably from the professional identity of university professors emergent in the later nineteenth century. I have given an account elsewhere, in a work in progress on "Literary Study in the Age of the New Class," of the relation between scientization and professionalization in the disciplines. These two strategies developed in tandem in the later nineteenth century when literary study modelled itself on the other sciences but diverged in the twentieth, when criticism partially displaced the scientized versions of literary study (philology and literary history) then dominant in the university while simultaneously claiming the status of a professional discourse.
into a discipline and of critics into professors did not resolve the epistemic dilemma, because the distinction between episteme and doxa became the basis for the system of the disciplines, permanently organized by the second half of the century around the division between the sciences (natural and social) and the humanities. The status of individual disciplines was only nominally or bureaucratically equal in this new constellation; their actual inequality (leaving aside issues of funding) was indicated by the fact that the names of the disciplines could be made to express allegorically the stakes of any epistemic conflict, even conflict within a single discipline. This allegorization of the disciplines continues into the present. When the economist Paul Krugman in a recent interview wanted to describe his quarrel with fellow economist Lester Thurow, he invoked a war "between the essentially literary sensibility that we expect of a cardcarrying intellectual [Thurow] and the scientific-mathematical outlook that is arguably the true glory of our civilization [Krugman] ."25 Whatever we may happen to think of this polemical tactic, it betrays the omnipresence of the epistemic conflict underlying the formation of the modern disciplines.
The derogation of the humanities as mere doxa is often accompanied by praise for their cultivating function, the latter usually described in the vaguest possible terms. It is important, I believe, to understand that these two attitudes are related to each other as recto and verso. In Higher Superstition, for example, Gross and Levitt allow that the humanities are "indispensable to our civilization and to the prospects of living a fulfilling life within it" but go on to question whether the humanities professoriate as it exists today is so indispensable for this function: "If, taking a fanciful hypothesis, the humanities department of MIT (a bastion, by the way, of left-wing rectitude) were to walk out in a huff, the scientific faculty could, at need and with enough release time, patch together a humanities curriculum, to be taught by the scientists themselves."26 To be sure, this "fanciful hypothesis" is egregious in every way, but less perhaps for its blatant political animus than for its assumption that the knowledge content of the humanities is nugatory. While those who work in the humanities are certainly not to blame for this perception, neither have they successfully explained to themselves and to others what kind of knowledge it is that they produce.
The intractability of the epistemic problem is related to the residual identity of criticism with cultural criticism, particularly in its reincarnation as cultural studies, which is at once the putative successor to a more narrowly defined literary study and the true heir to the latter's nineteenth- century precursor. The emergence of cultural studies belongs to any account of the Sokal affair in an important way. Cultural studies raised the stakes of epistemic conflict in the disciplines by extending the interpretive techniques of literary criticism to the social world.27 If cultural studies aspires to be the study of culture generally, however, it is not the same study of culture one finds in sociology or anthropology; it is not social science. The transition in U.S. literary study to cultural studies announced a desire to repossess the territory once claimed by the cultural critic, but more recently by social scientists-the human world.28 By reasserting a claim to speak authoritatively about society as whole, this mode of criticism adopted an implicitly adversarial relation to social science, which was explicit in its predecessor. We have only to return to the scene of discipline formation in the earlier twentieth century to recover the origins of this conflict, when both literary criticism and the social sciences achieved the status of university disciplines, often in competition with each other.29
In the light of this history we can see that it was precisely the epistemological implications of science studies, rather than any of its local arguments, that made it seem a desirable ally for the literary academy. The philosophical implications of science studies seemed to confirm positions within the discursive bloc of postmodernism in such a way as to allow science studies to be set apart from the general tendency of social science, particularly in the U.S. The systematic misrecognition of science studies hints that a struggle with social science was an unstated or repressed referent of the Sokal affair, a struggle that took the manifest form of an alliance with the sector of social science-science studies-that seemed to call into question the epistemic pretentions of the natural sciences (or science as such). Thus the fact that the social sciences in the U.S. had long ago usurped the authority of the cultural discourses to speak on matters of human concern continued to be repressed, while the old conflict be- We return here to the question of a recurrent antagonism to science posed earlier in order to understand why the Sokal affair turned on the assertion of an antirealist epistemology, reduced to the threadbare position-taking one finds in the discursive bloc of postmodernism. In fact it was the most provocative expression of this antirealism (from which one might have to retreat at times into common sense) by which criticism sought to engage in both the conflict of the faculties and the culture wars. If science no longer plays the role for criticism of an ultimate cause of modernity's ills, it does still play the part of "a sign of the times" (Carlyle), as the very discourse irremediably tainted by the realism, foundationalism, and universalism that are supposed to be at the base of social ills. In this allegorization of the disciplines, criticism is not only a discourse incommensurably different from science but also the discourse that "calls into question" the fundamental assumptions supporting the social prestige and disciplinary superiority of science. The stakes in this conflict were not in any profound sense philosophical but rather disciplinary: the possibility of an alliance between cultural studies and science studies. If that alliance had been successful, criticism stood to advance its effort to recover the human world as its proper object even while undercutting the basis for the scientific study of that world. But the Sokal affair turned the tide of this battle in another direction.
Social Constructions
It would certainly be placing too great a burden of significance on the Sokal affair to suggest that it brought cultural studies as a whole into 30. C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (New York, 1961), p. 17. 31. This point is more complex than I am able to treat adequately; but one additional factor in the rise of cultural studies can be acknowledged here, namely, a crisis in the social sciences themselves, the conspicuous exhaustion of the dominant empiricist paradigms of social analysis in the U.S. academy. This crisis created a kind of vacuum into which cultural studies rushed; unfortunately, it remains the case that the latter's paradigms of analysis are almost entirely derived from poststructuralist theory and that they continue to exclude other figures, such as Habermas or Bourdieu, who do not fall within the discursive bloc of postmodernism. It should also be pointed out that the exhaustion of empiricist social science prepared the way for encroachment from new methodologies of natural science, arising from cognitive science and from the field of information theory. permanent disrepute. Nonetheless, I do think it is the case that one effect of the hoax has been to enjoin upon those who do cultural studies a certain caution in framing the terms and the goals of their enterprise. Nowhere is this caution more evident than in the virtual disappearance of the term "social construction" from serious venues of criticism. This is not to say that the hypothesis of social construction does not still underlie much work in cultural studies, but that the phrase itself is difficult to utter now without some embarrassment, like the refrain of a too popular song. At least a portion of this embarrassment can be attributed to the effect of Sokal's relay of the term to the mass public sphere, where it was irrevocably linked to an extreme antirealism or skepticism about the claims of scientific knowledge.32 Realism, on the other hand, could be presented by Sokal shorn of any philosophical puzzles, as nothing more than common sense: "There is a real world; its properties are not merely socially constructed; facts and evidence do matter" ("P," p. 63).
In order to clarify the role played by the concept of social construction in the temporary alliance between cultural studies and science studies, it will be necessary to undertake here something like an archaeology of the term, the origins of which are somewhat mysterious.33 The prevalence of the phrase social construction in both science studies and cultural studies might convey the impression to anyone unfamiliar with these fields that they must have developed in association. As we know, however, the new social studies of science to which the Social Text special issue drew attention predated the emergence of cultural studies in the U.S. by at least a decade.34 That the concept of social construction appeared at different moments in both of these disciplinary locations is a fact that needs to be explained, not a reason for identifying the claims or interests of the two fields.
The appearance of the term social construction in the literary academy is roughly contemporaneous with the emergence in the mid-1980s of cultural studies in the U.S. While this new discourse originated in literature departments, cultural studies insisted that the political responsibility of criticism was best served by taking culture as its object rather than the work of literature. What literary critics actually did under the sign of cultural studies, however, was to extend techniques developed for analyzing literary texts to other cultural objects and practices.35 I am not interested so much in debating the legitimacy of this move as in observing that the practice of cultural studies was enabled by a tacit analogy between the obvious constructedness of the literary artifact and the constructedness of normative (usually this meant repressive) identity categories. Because the concept of construction was tacitly identified with the notion of representation, the relegation of literature in cultural studies amounted to its unwitting universalization. If social construction was the Archimedean lever by which the world itself-the world as culture-was to be dislodged from its normative complacency, the effectiveness of this lever was largely dependent on the strength of the analogy between literary representation and social construction. The methodology supporting the social construction hypothesis in literary study emerged, therefore, out of the immanent development of the discipline; it consisted of nothing other than those methods of textual interpretation perfected during the period of High Theory. The concept of a "social text" was itself a result of that immanent development.
The extension of textual interpretation to the larger domain of culture and the emergence of a politically motivated cultural studies must also be situtated in relation to certain external pressures, both institutional and political. Unfortunately, I can only enumerate these pressures here, without offering even a minimally adequate account of them. They include (1) the increased demand for credentialing in technical as opposed to humanistic fields; (2) the increasing demand on the literary professoriate to remediate the language skills of an ever expanding and more demographically diverse university population, effectively deemphasizing the study of literature; (3) the continued transfer of de facto acculturation functions from high culture to mass culture; and (4) the decisive shift to the Right of the political public sphere during the later seventies and eighties. All of these conditions combined to refocus the literary professoriate on questions of multiculturalism and of mass culture. The effect of these externalities was not only to undermine further the status of literary study as a discourse of knowledge-which could only weaken it in the modern system of university disciplines-but also to create an opportunity for the reassertion of "cultural criticism." The resulting discourse of cultural studies imagined itself ideally as circulating like its nineteenth-century precursor in a mass public sphere, although that sphere was in actuality restricted mostly to the classroom, the conference, or the scholarly journal.
If academy coincided with the emergence of cultural studies, we have not yet demonstrated how this concept was related to its apparent cognate in science studies. One explanation for the convergence of these parallel lines is obvious enough: The qualifier social in social construction always implied an antithetical concept of the natural. Yet the latter term was hardly identical in most contexts of usage to the concept of nature in the natural sciences. Constructionist critique more usually understood the natural opposed to the cultural or the social as a kind of metaphysical foundation, that is, an aspect of culture placed beyond question or "naturalized" (we shall return to this sense of nature later). Still, these two natures have overlapped in some historical circumstances. Particular scientific theories, for example, have on occasion supported practices of racism, sexism, or homophobia (among other ills) by grounding identity categories in a biological nature. Yet the critique of science's complicity in certain oppressive social practices is not the same as a critique that extends to the status of scientific truth generally.
The tendency of the social construction concept in cultural studies was ultimately, as we have noted, to equate the political and the epistemological. If race was once a category of biological science (it still is for some scientists, though very few), might not the manifest constructedness of this category, which resembles afiction, be indistinguishable from the constructedness of any object of scientific theory, including genes or quarks? The notion of social construction points in this direction; but for the most part, work in cultural studies was inhibited from extending its critique beyond those areas of science directly concerned with categories of social identity-in large part, no doubt, because such work was too remote from the disciplinary training of literary critics. holds out the possibility for great advantage but it also entails great risk. In the case of SSK, its claim to scientific status was contingent on its supersession of philosophy, particularly the epistemological debates that defined the subfield of the philosophy of science. In the Anglo-American academy, the locus of philosophy at the interface with science rather than literature constituted both a strength (association with science's preeminence among the disciplines) and a weakness (philosophy of science does not itself produce scientific knowledge). The turn to sociology seemed designed to avoid the weakness of a merely subordinate relation to science by aggressively demoting scientific knowledge itself to an object of knowledge; but it also required that SSK had to give up the philosopher's privilege of producing an epistemological defense of its own knowledge claims, precisely in order not to fall back into an identification with philosophy of science.
The difficulty of this strategy can be seen in the work of David Bloor, the most important theorist of SSK, and himself originally a philosopher. Bloor makes the strongest possible claim for the scientific status of SSK, that it gives a causal account of scientific knowledge on a par with causal accounts in the natural sciences: "The sociologist is concerned with knowledge, including scientific knowledge, purely as a natural phenomenon."42 This claim underlies the "constructivism" of SSK, which has the notorious but necessary entailment of relativizing the truth value of scientific knowledge (by way of the "symmetry postulate") at the same time that it reaffirms the fundamental identity of science as the causal explanation of phenomena. It is as though the answer to the epistemological question of whether or how knowledge in the natural sciences can be true had been sealed in an envelope, and the very scientific claims of SSK depended on never breaking that seal.
Obviously this version of constructivism, premised on a thoroughly naturalistic conception of scientific explanation, is rather remote from its cousin in cultural studies, which only has use for that part of the constructivist agenda that seems to call into question the epistemological preeminence of science. Bloor, on the contrary, values science so unreservedly that he refuses to exempt science itself from scientific explanation. This amounts in the end, however, to a rearrangement of the hierarchy of the sciences, since it is only sociology that can produce the objectification of the sciences themselves (including, of course, the sociology of science, according to the "reflexivity" clause of SSK's constitution). Up to a point this strategy is highly persuasive (Pierre Bourdieu makes a similar claim for his reflexive sociology); but its success depends on how convincingly it evacuates philosophy from its practice, as the discourse that is neither science nor the scientific study of science. What does it mean, then, when epistemology returns, when the practioners of science studies are drawn into making statements that sound like conventional philosophical argument, when they are forced to defend versions of antirealism or cultural relativism? Unfortunately, the supersession of philosophy, which constituted the sociology of science, also prevents its practioners from fully reoccupying the abandoned terrain of epistemology, and thus they are compelled to express philosophical positions in truncated form and sometimes to rehearse simplified versions of arguments long familiar in the philosophy of science.
Perhaps we need not take the more provocative of these philosophical statements too seriously. Sergio Sismondi has suggested (along with Hacking and others) that many versions of constructivism, in practice, are entirely compatible with realism or empiricism.43 He goes on to point out that provocatively antirealist position statements tend to be the ones "least thoroughly argued for, and often least central to constructivist sociologists' and historians' practice, playing a peripheral rhetorical role" (S, p. 50).44 Yet these "rhetorical" statements are just those that have made science studies controversial and just those that have made an alliance between cultural studies and science studies seem desirable. While it may not compromise the value of particular sociological or historical projects, the failure of science studies to refrain from philosophizing does have consequences for the conflict of the faculties. In that context, antirealist rhetoric circulates as an expression of social science's ambivalence in relation to natural science, which in turn provokes a censorious response from the scientists. The controversial reception of science studies (the science wars) was more the result of this epistemic conflict of the faculties than of political antagonisms. 45 When literary critics hear the rumor of this battle in the distance they may interpret it as portending victory for their party. But they would be wrong. The conflict of the social sciences with the natural sciences is 44. Jan Golinski suggests sensibly that we should regard constructivism strictly as a methodological procedure and not as a set of epistemological principles. See Jan Golinski, Making Natural Knowledge: Constructivism and the History of Science (Cambridge, 1998), p. 6. The problem is that some versions of constructivism have never been able to abide by this self-limitation.
45. While I would agree with Sismondi that constructivism of the strong or "neoKantian" sort is largely irrelevant to the practice of science studies and is often nothing more than a "gloss overlying accounts" (S, p. 126), I would insist that the real use of this "gloss" is in the conflict of tht faculties. Philosophers such as Sismondi or Hacking want to sort out and resolve if possible the very problems that provide the desired occasion for disciplinary polemics. The absence of a disciplinary context for understanding these polemics is why Hacking finds the Sokal affair ultimately inexplicable, especially its politics. He writes that while he is "deeply sympathetic to both sides" in the debate, he has "nothing to contribute" to it (Hacking, The Social Construction of What? p. 96). not identical to the conflict of the humanities with the sciences. This point can be confirmed even in the case of Latour's "network" theory, which is admittedly much closer to postmodernism, or the literary pole of the disciplines. If Bloor exited philosophy by way of a certain reading of Wittgenstein, Latour engineered a similar though more ambiguous exit by means of a theoretical sublimation of conflict within the French philosophical field.46 Bourdieu has remarked that this field is characterized by "the constant opposition between a pole close to science, concerned with epistemology, the philosophy of science, and logic, and a pole close to art and literature in its objects and mode of expression.'' Latour kept this opposition in play by entering the field of social science where it was closest to the latter pole, in "participant observer" studies or ethnography. This permitted him and his collaborators to devise a version of science studies in which the storytelling of the ethnographer reflexively projected an image of science as storytelling, thus soliciting an analogy to literary fiction.
Network theory was designed to be theoretically more resistant than SSK to redescription in terms of conventional epistemology. So Latour and Woolgar declare that "the particular branch of philosophy-epistemology-which holds that the only source of knowledge are ideas of reason intrinsic to the mind, is an area whose total extinction is overdue." But they insist that this is "not an attack on philosophy"--far from it.48 Philosophy must continue in some fashion as an "ontological" project, expressed in the radical overcoming of binaries such as that between society and nature, which permits Latour and Woolgar to represent both scientists and their objects as equally "real," as actors or actants.49 In this stances is faithfully reproduced in the most notorious sentence of Sokal's hoax article, partially quoted above and which I now quote in full:
It has thus become apparent that physical 'reality,' no less than social 'reality,' is at bottom a social and linguistic construct; that scientific knowledge, far from being objective, reflects and encodes the dominant ideologies and power relations of the culture that produced it; that the truth claims of science are inherently theory-laden and self-referential; and consequently, that the discourse of the scientific community, for all its undeniable value, cannot assert a privileged epistemological status with respect to counterhegemonic narratives emanating from dissident or marginalized communities. ["T," pp.
217-18]
Let us remind ourselves that this summa of quotations from the postmodern Zeitgeist expressed the tendency of Sokal's article that had to be affirmed, however flatfooted the rhetoric. Among the solecisms of the passage, we can single out as most conspicuous the illogical connection between the first and subsequent clauses. Historians of science who might concede at least some of the claims in the latter clauses would probably still laugh the first out of court. There is no necessary logical connection between the philosophical antirealism of the first clause and an acknowledgment of the political or social embeddedness of science. Yet both of these complex notions have been routinely unfolded from the phrase "social construction." This phrase came too trippingly to the tongues of too many, and here it is again tripping us up very badly. With such soothing and familiar language a trap was laid for the editors of Social Text, committing them to the tacit endorsement of a teasingly extreme antirealism, a position with which cultural studies at large seemed to toy as a provocation, as a means of eliciting the naive realism that could then be condemned as politically reactionary. The physicists were provoked, the mathematicians were provoked. They emitted a burst of "spontaneous philosophy" like an agitated lump of uranium. Sokal's hoax called the bluff of the provocation, however, after which it was too late to protest, "of course we believe in physical reality." As the responses to the hoax amply demonstrated, there is no way up from a discourse that has sunk so low.
In its meandering path from social construction to "dissident and marginalized communities," Sokal's notorious sentence merely restated the dubious correlation of epistemology with politics in much current cultural theory-so much theory and yet not enough theory! It was precisely this correlation that permitted the science wars to be presented as just another site of the culture wars. There is, let us insist, no simple identity of persons or opinions between the antagonists in the science wars and the antagonists in the culture wars. To be sure, the science wars have attracted conservative scientists like E. O. Wilson to the culture wars; but even if the majority of scientists were so inclined politically, this would hardly prove that their politics derived from philosophical realism.55 In any case, scientists differ significantly in their commonly held beliefs from the vast right-wing sector of American society.56 On the far Right, Americans are often quite selective about what parts of science they choose to credit, if any.57 So let us admit that the science wars were never simply an extension of the culture wars.
If the theme of social construction in literary and cultural studies seemed to justify linking the science wars to the culture wars, we might be disposed now to dismiss it as a false cognate of its simulacrum in science studies; but that is not the point I would like to make. Rather, what demands to be brought forward is the consequential ambiguity of the concept of nature that sprawls across the disciplines, an ambiguity that authorizes the interpretive procedure eventuating in the notion of social construction. That procedure can be expressed formulaically as follows: For any relation between a and b, if a is asserted to be the cause or legitimizing ground of b, then it will be possible to call b into question by showing that a is really the effect of b, not its cause. This elegant procedure works for nearly any a or b, but the variables ultimately stand in for the terms nature and culture respectively.58 Indeed, the political claim for this procedure is most evident when the variable a is a placeholder for the concept of nature. 55. We need not, then, deny that the import of E. O. Wilson's sociobiological speculation is socially conservative; but neither should we underestimate the difference between Wilson and the culture warriors in the legislatures, for whom any version of Darwinian evolution is nothing less than the gospel of Satan. This point would be even more apparent in the case of the physicist Weinberg, whose critique of science studies (see n. 1) is particularly harsh but whose vehemently atheist modernism would make him a dubious ally for the reactionary side in the culture wars. Once we leave the precincts of the academy, we might be inclined to take a rather different view of the social power of science in its largest signification as knowledge. In the great world, it is still the case, as Hobbes wrote, that "sciences are small power." The struggle of cultural modernity is still as much against the forces of ignorance and prejudice as it is against the manifest power of science and the abuse of that power. In a certain respect, the procedure I have just described can be seen as nothing other than a descendant of the skeptical critique inaugurating modernity-that is, the critique of tradition. In this context, nature signifies what is given or unquestioned in the social domain, an order of things. The residue of this philological history is dispersed throughout ordinary language, for example in the adverbial form naturally, which typically invokes the givenness of the social order: "Naturally, I was offended by his remarks." This usage concentrates in one word the entire normative force of culture but without necessarily invoking the nature of natural science. A difficulty arises when this adverbial nature is simply conflated with the nature of natural science. While the latter concept is not identical to the socially given, it has become a given of modern culture; as such, this nature is just as deservedly the object of critique as its predecessor.59 There is no question that cultural norms (what is natural in the old sense) can be reinforced in modernity by grounding them in the nature disclosed by natural science. This is just the basis for the political critique of science. The utility of the semantic confusion for cultural studies extends well beyond this critique, however, because it provides an opportunity for reasserting the antagonism to science of the old cultural criticism. If it is science's nature that underlies the naturalization of all cultural practices, then it is easy to see that an alliance between cultural studies and science studies would be very desirable indeed.
But is science the social constructor of the nature that is supposed to exist beneath and before culture, as culture's physical (that is, metaphysical) foundation? If science is indeed the social constructor of nature, and the source of the realist epistemology that equates nature with the prediscursive, the material, the real, then cultural studies finds here its most potent political adversary as well as the proper scene of its political intervention. Unfortunately, even were critics to succeed in convincing everyone who will listen that there is nothing that is not socially constructed, it is likely that human beings would continue to naturalize social categories and practices. For that reason there is in my view little political gain to be had in denying the difference between the concept of quarks, on the one hand, and the concept of race on the other. Race does not need science to construct it; quarks do. The obliteration of this difference marks the reduction of a political problem such as racism to an epistemological problem-the social construction of science's nature. A history of racism would point to another possibility, that scientific racism is the effect of which it is taken to be the cause.60 59. The "nature" of natural science was indisputably "socially constructed" in the Early Modern era in the sense that the nature devoid of spiritual agencies and occult forces exists for some cultures but not for others. Just how difficult it was to construct this nature can be glimpsed in such works as Robert Boyle's A Free Enquiry into the Vulgarly Receiv'd Notion of Nature (London, 1686).
Cause and effect in this formulation might be conceived in terms of Althusser's
If the most radical version of constructivism has ambiguous implications in the political field, its application is obvious in the conflict of the faculties.61 The elevation of social construction from methodological procedure to epistemological principle criticized by Sismondi empowers the humanities to contest the epistemic dominance of the sciences. From the summit of epistemology the critics can taunt the scientists, "You have the numbers, but we have the heights." Constructivism in this context derives its power from the tradition of skepticism, which it rehearses in the spontaneous mode. This is why cultural critics feel that they need not make any other knowledge claims for their discourse than the negative claim of critique-of calling into question-a gesture that often enough concludes rather begins argument. The skeptic, however, can win every battle and still lose the war. The desire to know drives the enterprise of science, and science prevails historically despite the impressive philosophical advantage of skeptical argument-which, as philosophers know, is virtually indefeasible. Granted the importance of skeptical argument in the history of philosophy, its appearance in the present conflict of the faculties testifies to a crisis of knowledge in the humanities rather than in the sciences. In the last century this crisis has passed through two phases: In the earlier twentieth century the crisis gave rise not to skepticism but tofideism, the prevailing tendency of the New Critics.62 But history also reveals that skepticism and fideism are mutually implicated positions, which makes the skepticism of the literary academy at the end of the century a less reassuring alternative to fideism than it might at first seem, only the second phase of the ongoing crisis of cultural knowledge.63 "structural causality." It takes nothing less than the social totality to produce the phenomenon of racism, and scientific racism functions within this totality as both the effect and the support of racism generally.
61. There would be little reason to dissent from a constructivism aimed at demonstrating how social norms and practices are naturalized. As I have pointed out, this procedure descends from the inaugural moment of cultural modernity and it is closely related to the "procedural skepticism" of science itself. It is precisely this close relation between skepticism and science that makes it difficult to construct a political critique of science-though of course, all the more necessary. For a different version of such a critique than the one prevalent in the U.S. academy, see Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, trans. Mark Ritter (London, 1992). Beck's notion of "reflexive modernization" envisions a scientific critique of science, one that is not based in the discourse of cultural criticism.
62. The subject of the relation among practical criticism, New Criticism, and the sciences is too large to take up here. Criticism of this era was deeply concerned with defending culture against the encroachment of science. The dominance of Eliot in cultural theory of the period indicates how thoroughly the fate of culture was perceived to be implicated in that of religion. 
We Have Always Been Postmodern
The endgame of skepticism is played from a position of weakness, which can be given a precise occasion in the system of the disciplines. It arises from the difference between the methodology of the sciences (observation, experiment, quantification) and the methodology of criticism (interpretation). In the epistemic hierarchy of the disciplines, interpretation was long ago derogated to the status of a dubious knowledge, perhaps only a species of opinion. Thus it has been notoriously difficult to give an account of the knowledge produced by interpretation that would not immediately invite invidious comparison with the sciences. This situation had two consequences in the U.S. academy that bear on the present argument. First, the social sciences were led to discard interpretation as much as possible from their methodological repertoire.64 And, second, the humanities came to be identified as the disciplines whose only method was interpretation.
I draw attention to this familiar feature of the system of disciplines in the U.S. because it will permit us to understand the appeal of a disciplinary strategy that would otherwise seem self-undermining. In the last several decades, interpretation has been reconceived as an instrument for the skeptical critique of knowledge-claims; to this end it functions very differently from the procedure of that name in Dilthey or Weber, both of whom saw interpretation as a means of producing knowledge. Since then interpretation has been enlarged into a holistic principle governing all sites and modes of knowledge production. In the supremely confident phrase of Stanley Fish, "Interpretation is the only game in town."65 Hence even the natural sciences can now be seen as depending in certain epistemologically fatal ways on the moment of interpretation. Such a "universal hermeneutics," as Charles Taylor itivism in the nineteenth century as a disciplinary common sense swept away the old conflict of the faculties made famous by Kant-between the "higher" (theology, medicine, and law) and the "lower" (philosophy) faculties-and inaugurated a new struggle that resulted ultimately in the modern division of the disciplines into the sciences and the humanities. The advantage of now replacing the tedious debate between realism and antirealism with a history of positivism and its antagonists is that we shall be able to see that criticism belongs to this history, even today.74
My discussion of this question has two aims: first, to dissolve once and for all the supposedly necessary link between epistemology and politics (or, more precisely, to insert the mediating factors between these terms); and, second, to demonstrate that the positional skepticism of postmodernist literary and cultural studies is a losing strategy in the conflict of the faculties, one that relegates humanistic disciplines to the status of opinion or, worse, a kind of theology. The appropriate alternative to this strategy is to define and develop a knowledge of culture fully integrated into the spectrum of human sciences.
I begin with a cautionary tale on the subject of positivism, derived from Fritz Ringer's important and moving study, The Decline of the German Mandarins.75 Ringer tells the story of the German academic community during the period between 1890 and 1933, when it was dominated by the group he calls (after Weber) the "mandarins." These were the humanistically trained professors who saw themselves as the "bearers of culture" (Kulturtrdger) for German society, the advocates of education as Bildung. Their social importance in the nineteenth century was vastly greater than that of their counterparts in Anglo-American higher education, as they controlled access to civil service positions. At the height of their power, they achieved near social equality with the aristocratic class, but by the later nineteenth century their position in society was threatened by the increasing social influence of an emergent bourgeoisie as well as by the undoubted successes of the natural and social sciences. These new sciences were described and also stigmatized as positivist, though positivism meant different things in different disciplines; it was sometimes openly avowed, sometimes merely implicit in a methodology. At this point we are prepared to take into account the major upheaval in the history that determines our present situation. While the predominantly conservative political orientation of criticism continued into the 1960s, that orientation was completely reversed in the space of a decade, largely as a result of external factors (everything that is evoked by "the sixties"). The political orientation of the humanist professsoriate shifted massively from the Right to the Left at the same time that the scientific professoriate was to some extent depoliticized (or in some sectors, propelled to the Right). After a long hiatus in which criticism had become accommodated to the postwar political order, the reemergence of cultural criticism in the seventies and eighties made it possible to renew the conflict of the faculties once again as a war between Left and Right, but with the political affiliations of the two cultures reversed. At the same time, the hierarchy of the disciplines favoring the sciences remained in place. No longer the recusants of the academy, the critics might be described after the sixties as enthusiasts-like the Nonconformist Protestants after the Restoration, they were still marginalized, but at the other end of the political spectrum.79
These are the conditions that overdetermine the link between epistemology and politics in the present milieu. From this history we must retrieve one other major event, the methodological revolution in literary study that replaced Anglo-American theory with French theory. The significance of this event was that it provided the literary professoriate with a powerful new weapon for contesting the epistemic superiority of the 79. This is why the Sokal affair fails to map politically onto the Snow-Leavis controversy. For an analogous version of the above argument, see Carl Schorske, "The New Rigorism in the Human Sciences," in American Academic Culture in Transformation, ed. Thomas Bender and Schorske (Princeton, N.J., 1997), pp. 324-27. Schorske contrasts the social activism of prewar economics with its postwar scientism and, conversely, the "strange reversal of roles" among the literary professoriate, as it abandoned "aesthetic detachment" and "took up social-critical functions" (p. 325). I understand this reversal as marking the recurrence of cultural criticism, the condition of which recurrence was paradoxically the success of "aesthetic" criticism in competition with other, more positivist modes of literary study in the university. This "aesthetic" criticism, it must always be recalled, descended directly from the cultural criticism of the nineteenth century.
sciences. The dissemination of poststructuralist and postmodernist thought enabled criticism to undertake a critique of positivist modes of knowledge far more sophisticated than its New Critical precursors. Skepticism replaced the fideism of the New Critics, and this new epistemic position was fused with the new political orientation of criticism. The result of this systemic realignment was a new version of the conflict of the faculties, in which it became possible for criticism to imagine a more direct assault on the fortress of science, whose towers it believed had already been undermined by science studies. What we now call the Sokal affair represented at once the trajectory and the limit of this tendency in criticism. An alliance between science studies and cultural studies promised to strengthen the position of the literary professoriate in the conflict of the faculties by assigning an adversarial political role to science. Linking the science wars to the culture wars seemed to close the circuit between the epistemology underlying the division of the disciplines and the politics transcending them.
In my view, the division of the disciplines cannot be reduced to the difference between positivism and skepticism any more than it can be elevated to the great war of Left and Right. Its relation to both sets of antagonisms is more complex, more historically ambiguous. The fact that these several antagonisms are confused in the spontaneous postmodernism of the literary academy suggests that it is a mistake to channel these antagonisms through the conflict of the faculties. One lesson to be drawn from this fact is that criticism might now advance by withdrawing from the conflict. If positivism is a holistic or totalizing ideology that reserves the name of knowledge only for the results of the scientific method (narrowly defined), it does not follow that the critical disciplines must be based on a counterholism in which everything is interpretation Let us above all acknowledge the danger of allegorizing the disciplines as representatives of inherent political or philosophical positions. The cost of this allegorization has been very heavy for those who do literary and cultural studies. Having failed to settle the epistemic status of criticism, which threatens always to fall to the level of mere opinion, the critics have embraced their abjection and turned it around into its opposite, into epistemic superiority. The division of the disciplines into sciences and humanities has been triumphantly reconceived as the distinction between knowledge and the critique of knowledge. It is by no means necessary to deny the value of critique in order to make the argument that the critique of knowledge is not the privilege of one discipline or group of disciplines.82 81. In the Sokal affair, the spontaneous philosophy of the scientists has been carelessly identified with the historiographical concept of Enlightenment, as the rationalist precursor of positivism. Nowhere is the character of postmodernism as a spontaneous philosophy more evident than in the anathema that has come to be attached to the notion of Enlightenment, now equated with the most naive realism and the most offensive politics. It should not be necessary to defend the Enlightenment in toto in order to restore to philosophical modernity both its discourse of reason and the possibility of a self-reflexive critique of rationalist universalism such as Herder inaugurated. On this subject we might invoke the entire oeuvre of Charles Taylor. For a comment on the conflation of modernism with the Enlightenment, see Hollinger, "The Knower and the Artificer," p. 49.
82. I can only suggest briefly here two principles for future discussion of this point: (1) It is an inescapable condition of modernity that the critique of knowledge is most effective when it arises from knowledge-practice or expertise. This is just what Foucault was suggesting in his attempt to move from the model of "universal intellectual" to "specific intellectual." It is no small irony of Foucault's reception that the Foucaultianism of cultural studies has supported nothing less than the renewed claim of literary critics to the identity of universal intellectuals. (2) If it follows that scientists are the most effective critics of science, this still leaves the question of the proper location and form of such critique unsettled, to stand in the public sphere, if we fail to recognize that our spontaneous philosophy hardly makes up for a failure to define and defend the knowledge-claims of criticism.
In taking up this last question, I return to a point made earlier, that a struggle with social science has all along been the repressed referent of the Sokal affair (and the conflict of the faculties of which the latter was the symptom). The absence of an ongoing Methodenstreit in the U.S. continues to debilitate the system of the disciplines. For this reason the humanities have been perennially tempted to identify themselves with cultural criticism and its opposition to science, a position most recently supported by an interpretive holism generalized from the instance of the literary text. Because the social sciences and the humanities were thus polarized between naturalistic and interpretive methodologies, the terrain lying between between these polarized positions-that of an interpretive human science-remains underdeveloped to this day.
Without question, the disciplinary bridge over this gap is history, which has intermittently grounded literary and cultural studies. It seems evident in retrospect that the humanities have alternated between an orientation toward the positive knowledge of history and toward the function of cultural critique, sometimes in the same work; but there is no reason to assume that these motives are simply incompatible, much less that the assertion of a positive knowledge would lead us back into the desert of positivism.84 On the other hand, it would probably not be advisable to attempt a reconstruction of the disciplines by reinstating Dilthey's strict division of the disciplines between Naturwissenschaft and Geisteswissenschaft, the latter based on historical interpretation or Verstehen. The social sciences have already come too far in demonstrating that the methods of natural science have a place in the study of human society. But it is certainly within our power to move in the direction of a complementarity of methodologies, in which the claims of different kinds of science, as also of different kinds of historical interpretation, can be assigned to appropriate objects and registers, and conflicting claims in the human sciences reconciled by negotiation rather than conflict.
With regard to the future of the humanities, it is perhaps worth entertaining the notion that this category for organizing disciplines has outlived its usefulness and that until we recognize literary and cultural studies as sciences too, the humanities will continue to stand in opposi- 
